It's a new era for the Cowboys. Mike McCarthy is the ninth head coach in Cowboys franchise history. Along with McCarthy has come a bevy of new coaches including defensive coordinator Mike Nolan. Nolan has a great opportunity to improve a defense that was too easily exposed under Rod Marinelli and Kris Richard.
A lot of folks have pointed towards the Cowboys' low blitz numbers under the past regime. Both coaches admitted blitzing wasn't something they wanted to do often. According to George Iloka, who spent time with the Cowboys leading up to the 2019 season battling for a job, neither was the desire to disguise their defensive plans. The Cowboys defense, especially last year, was pretty predictable and thus not very successful. When that's the case and personnel change brings upon an opportunity for strategic change, people tend to want the opposite. That blanket desire, however, is also misguided. Let's loosely examine the realities of blitzing and why the timing, and not the volume, was an issue for the Cowboys.
All things being equal, there's tons of available data that suggests coverage density, or, having seven or even eight in coverage, equates more to defensive success and winning than consistently high blitz rates. That only works, however, if you can apply QB pressure with just four pass-rushers. Contrary to perception, that actually wasn't a huge issue for the Cowboys in 2019. It wasn't necessarily a strength, but their QB pressure rates were middle-of-the-pack thanks to the work on Tank Lawrence who, despite a lower-than-usual sack count was a fixture in the backfield, and Robert Quinn. So, what's the issue? The issue is the phrase "all things being equal" because in reality, it never is.
Different teams and different quarterbacks present different challenges. One week you face a QB who is good at this and bad at that and then the traits are reversed for the next week's signal-caller. Some quarterbacks tear blitzing teams a part while others struggle mightily. With that said, it would make sense to respond accordingly, which the Cowboys' leaders stubbornly had no interest in doing.
Sam Darnold has been bad against pressure in his young career so you think the Cowboys would expose that, right? Nope. Their pressure packages were more-or-less the same that week as any other. What happened? Sam Darnold tore up the Cowboys like he tore up Penn State in the Rose Bowl a few years back. On the flip side, Kirk Cousins has always done well against pressure. While the Cowboys lost to the Vikings, it was more because of Dalvin Cook than Captain Kirk. Cousins threw for just 220 yards, 86 of which went to Dalvin Cook out of the backfield. Non-running back pass catchers compiled just 132 receiving yards on 15 receptions. All of Cousins's non-throw away incompletions were on passes intended to receivers. Cousins wasn't bad but he certainly didn't beat the Cowboys. Dalvin Cook, who had 183 total yards, was the main culprit.
The biggest problem under the Marinelli and Richard reign was not their unwillingness to blitz, but their unwillingness to adapt and adjust. It's one thing to ask a QB to constantly throw deep when he doesn't throw a good deep ball, but whose to say that the Cowboys didn't have good blitzing personnel. It wasn't like their aversion to the blitz was based on playing personnel. That's the issue.
We all want more turnovers. When a quarterback has indecision and uncertainty, you'll often get more turnovers or, at minimum, more game-changing plays like sacks or poor third-down conversion rates. While my Fortnite and Call of Duty experience is limited, I know a lot of you play. When you know exactly where all your opponents are and where they're moving at all times, chances are you stand a better chance of success than when you aren't sure where they are, right? The key isn't to have an identity of being a blitz heavy team or a light blitzing team, the key is to not really have an identity either way. The key is to be unpredictable and to be willing and able to maintain your core principles while adjusting and adapting to the opposition.
