(670 The Score) The Cubs front office, as led by Theo Epstein, waited too damn long. They self-scouted their own young position players poorly, falling in love with potential as much as any fan. They got so close -- too close.
Through the years, Epstein and then-general manager Jed Hoyer neither traded some of the young core players when they could have nor locked them up long term at a reasonable price.
The organization -- and the fans -- are paying the price in this offseason.
The team's trade of right-hander Yu Darvish to the Padres is a sad truth every Cubs observer has felt coming, finally exposed in full. Economic concerns are finally aligned enough with on-field realities -- the time for moves to remake the roster is now. This is despite having the worst front office leverage and bargaining power than at any time since 2014.
The Cubs aren't good enough to win it all. Good enough to win the division? Clearly, because they just did, though a longer season might have exposed the flaws and seen the lead blown.
But good enough to win it all? Good enough to win a series or three against the Braves, Dodgers, Astros, Indians or Rays? Nope.
You know this. You knew it all of this past season, as many of you screamed that the division lead was fool’s gold built on a red-hot start. Built on the fact that the culture was in a great spot, with a new manager helping to ensure it was so.
But you knew the Cubs weren’t good enough. And the playoffs showed it. The offensive mix isn't good enough. That has been true and plain to see since the end of 2018.
After the All-Star break that year, the Cubs ranked 24th in MLB in home runs, 23rd in OPS and 27th in slugging percentage.
From Sept. 1, 2018 and on from there, as they famously allowed a hot Brewers team to come back and take the division away, the Cubs ranked 25th in OPS (.663) and 27th in slugging percentage (.363). Only two other teams hit fewer homers than the Cubs' 22 in September/October.
Epstein knew it. On Oct. 3, 2018, he admitted the Cubs offense was broken. He referenced the Cubs' record in games in which they scored at least two runs in the second half of the season: 37-13. They just couldn't plate two runs often enough.
“Something happened in our offense in the second half where we stopped walking, we stopped hitting home runs, we stopped hitting the ball in the air and we stopped being productive," he said then. "Not being able to get two runs is really unacceptable, and it sort of tells a story a little bit of the end of our season too.”
That offseason was clearly the time for the Cubs to act, to bust up a core that wasn’t good enough, to make the kind of difficult trades necessary to creatively extend a competitive window.
They did nothing of consequence to the big league core. They picked up Daniel Descalso. They dumped Tommy La Stella. Whoops.
In 2019, it was clear the Cubs weren’t good enough, again. They missed the playoffs entirely, due to a September collapse as manager Joe Maddon walked away with grace.
After the season, Epstein warned that "real changes" throughout the organization were likely to come, saying the Cubs' were "open-minded about the roster."
They did nothing of consequence to the big league core. They revamped the scouting and development departments, a worthwhile effort long overdue.
But no moves of consequence to the big league core were made. The Cubs added Steven Souza, who wouldn’t last to September on the roster.
The 2020 playoffs were an ugly flameout, due to the offense. Again.
Javier Baez, Kris Bryant and Anthony Rizzo are 19-for-141 in postseason games since 2016. That’s a .134 batting average with 51 strikeouts and six walks.
Now here in this terrible offseason for leverage, the Cubs have pushed themselves into a corner with nothing but ugly walls in sight.
Epstein loved this team. He loved those young players -- too much, in fact. He didn’t want to be the one making these decisions, so much so that he left $10 million on the table by stepping down in November with one year left on his contract.
From the third paragraph of his brilliant, clear letter to staff as he left the organization, Epstein wrote: “First, the organization faces many decisions this winter that carry long-term consequences; those types of decisions are best made by someone who will be here for a long period rather than for just one more year.”
Jed Hoyer, the tough spot is yours.
And, because the Epstein-Hoyer regime waited two too many offseasons to make definitive, needle-threading moves and because they failed to draft and develop as they had earlier in Chicago and for years in Boston, the Cubs chose to accept their dual economic and competitive realities now.
By trading Darvish, their best player, at his peak, at the age of 34. The moment, in this economy, in the industry, in this Hot Stove climate, lent itself to terrible leverage.
And still the Cubs chose to act.
The division isn't actively getting better. Not a single team.
And still they chose to act. Perhaps the Cubs can spin this in their heads as well, that this step back still won't keep them from contending within the division. And that may indeed be true.
Because the Cubs are a corporation, as well as an entertainment product. Baseball teams feel like a public trust. Sports tugs on our emotions in this way, allowing connection and optimism and hope amidst the appearance of familial bonds.
But in the end, the corporation will make the cold, hard choices it feels it must make. And you, dear fan, will get caught in the crossfire.
This is when sports hurt.
Matt Spiegel hosts Hit & Run and Inside the Clubhouse on 670 The Score. Follow him on Twitter @MattSpiegel670. For more from and about Spiegel visit www.mattspiegel.com.